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ABSTRACT: Epistemological disjunctivists such as Duncan Pritchard claim that in 
paradigmatic cases of knowledge the rational support for the known propositions is both 
factive and reflectively accessible. This position faces some problems, including the basis 
problem – how can our knowledge be based on such strong reasons that seem to leave no 
room for non-knowledge and therefore presuppose knowledge? – and the access problem 
– can disjunctivists avoid the implausible claim that we can achieve knowledge through 
inference from our introspective awareness of those reasons? I argue that disjunctivists 
cannot solve both of these problems at the same time by posing the dilemma question 
whether we can have factive and reflectively accessible reasons without knowledge. While 
I focus on Pritchard throughout most of the paper, I argue in the last section that other 
anti-skeptical versions of disjunctivism face the same dilemma. 
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Epistemological disjunctivism is the claim that in certain cases of knowledge, the 
rational support for the known propositions is both factive and reflectively 
accessible. Most advocates take this position to address skepticism, in particular what 
Duncan Pritchard calls the underdetermination problem, which arises from the 
claim that we have no rational grounds that would favor our everyday beliefs over 
corresponding skeptical hypotheses. His point is that when and if our beliefs in such 
propositions are true, we can have factive reflectively accessible reasons that support 
them, but given they are false, it is impossible to have such factive reasons. 
While it may seem attractive that epistemological disjunctivism (henceforth I 
will drop “epistemological”) can provide such a treatment of skepticism, there are 
also important problems. Pritchard notes three “core problems:” first, the basis 
problem, which arises because the reasons the disjunctivist claims may seem to 
presuppose or be substantially equivalent to knowing, and thus not be considered a 
possible basis for knowledge. Thus, the disjunctivist needs to provide conceptual 
room for such reasons without knowledge. Second, the access problem: it seems that 
if our factive reasons are reflectively accessible, we can infer from having those 
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reasons that the corresponding proposition is true. But that would mean that 
whenever we have such reasons, we can achieve knowledge that what they suggest 
is true just by reflection alone. This seems obviously false. And third, the 
distinguishability problem, which arises because one cannot plausibly be capable of 
distinguishing between the truth of a common sense proposition and a skeptical 
scenario in which this proposition is false. But it may seem that when one has a 
factive reflectively accessible reason, one is actually able to distinguish these two 
cases, which would be a repugnant conclusion. 
I wish to argue here that disjunctivism cannot be defended against all of these 
problems, at least not insofar as it is understood as a position that can address 
skepticism. The rough idea is that once the disjunctivist has avoided the basis 
problem by making room for cases of reflectively accessible factive reasons without 
knowledge, she also has to accept that in such cases there is a reflective route to 
knowing the relevant propositions. This reinforces the access problem and also leads 
to complications with the disjunctivist response to the underdetermination problem. 
I will begin to lay out this line of argument in greater detail by discussing skepticism 
and the underdetermination problem. Next I will discuss Pritchard’s influential 
version of disjunctivism and review his discussion of the three problems mentioned 
above. I will try to show that not only do we have to reject at least one of Pritchard’s 
responses to these problems, but also that there is a more general dilemma for anti-
skeptical brands of disjunctivism making it impossible to address both problems in a 
consistent way. Finally, I will discuss the implication for two different versions of 
disjunctivism. I will there argue that other versions of disjunctivism are under the 
same pressure as Pritchard’s to answer whether there are reflectively accessible 
factive reasons without knowledge, although the contextualized version has a 
somewhat better outlook to overcome the dilemma. 
I. Skepticism and Underdetermination 
Pritchard points out that an important virtue of disjunctivism is that it can address a 
particular strand of skepticism, namely what he calls the underdetermination 
problem. He distinguishes this problem from another problem of Cartesian 
skepticism, the closure-based skeptical paradox. Both types of skepticism are 
Cartesian in the sense that they are both motivated by reference to skeptical 
scenarios. I will here use Descartes’ original Evil Demon scenario: while we interpret 
our perceptual appearances as being caused by an external world that is in line with 
most of our beliefs, we might also be the victims of a deception by an evil demon 
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who has been supplying these appearances directly to us.1 In such a case, all our 
empirical beliefs might turn out to be false.  
The skeptical problem I will be more concerned with here is the 
underdetermination problem. The underlying idea was introduced by Keith Lehrer 
and Stewart Cohen:2 compare two subjects, S1 who is in a world roughly as we 
assume the world really is, and S2, who is in a skeptical scenario. Suppose both have 
the exact same perceptual experience and the same beliefs. Suppose both have (in a 
epistemically unobjectionable manner) formed the empirical belief that p, but while 
S1’s belief is true, S2 is mistaken about p due to deception. Both appear to be justified 
in their belief that p in the same way.3 But this suggests that our justification is 
disconnected from the truth of p. 
Pritchard turns this worry into a more precise skeptical argument that aims 
to actually establish a skeptical conclusion.4 The starting point of this argument 
derives from the line above and states that a subject such as S1 must have the same 
rational support for believing any given proposition as S2. Thus we cannot have such 
rational support that favors the hypothesis that we are a subject like S1 over the 
hypothesis that we are a subject like S2. The skeptical allegation then is that we 
cannot have knowledge of any proposition for which we lack rational support that 
favors it over a skeptical scenario. 
The most powerful version of underdetermination-based skepticism is, as 
Pritchard argues, a version concerned with rationally grounded empirical 
knowledge. He formulates this type of skepticism as based on the 
underdeterminationRK principle:  
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational 
basis that favors p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p.5 
This principle gives rise to an “inconsistent triad:” 
(I) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief in an everyday 
                                                        
1 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, transl. Donald Cress, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co, 1993), AT VII 21-3. 
2 Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, “Justification, Truth, and Coherence,” Synthese 55 (1983): 191-
207. 
3 Cf. Ram Neta and Duncan Pritchard, “McDowell and the New Evil Genius,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 381-96. 
4 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 29-32. 
5 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 34. 
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proposition over an incompatible radical skeptical hypothesis. 
(II) The underdeterminationRK principle. 
(III) One has widespread rationally grounded everyday knowledge.6 
Given that (III) is supposed to apply to subjects who know about incompatible 
skeptical scenarios to their beliefs, we face an inconsistency and will have to give up 
one of these three claims. 
The above formulation of the underdeterminationRK principle is especially 
powerful because it even leaves the epistemic externalist without any special 
resources to deny it: the notion of rationally grounded knowledge is directly tied to 
the notion of a rational basis. In fact, the only way of denying the 
underdeterminationRK principle is to say that one may, at least in some cases, not 
need a rational basis that favors ones beliefs over skeptical hypotheses. The challenge 
then is to say under which conditions we do not need rational grounds counting 
against such skeptical hypotheses. Epistemic contextualists try to give such 
conditions (or sometimes just claim that there are such conditions), but discussing 
these proposals is beyond my scope here. 
The other option to avoid the skeptical paradoxes of course is to deny (I). The 
difficulty in denying this is that rational support is apparently an internalistic notion. 
But there is no apparent internal difference between subjects in a regular scenario 
and subjects in a corresponding skeptical scenario. The disjunctivist strategy is to 
include an external element in the notion of rational support while retaining the 
internalistic features, in particular the idea that we have reflective access to our 
rational support. I will discuss this position in the next section. 
II. Epistemological Disjunctivism 
The basic idea of epistemological disjunctivism is traced back to John McDowell,7 or 
at least his interpretation by Ram Neta and Pritchard.8 Pritchard has later adapted a 
modification of this, namely: 
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has perceptual 
knowledge that Φ in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R, for her 
                                                        
6 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 35, my enumeration. 
7 John McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 
(1995): 877–893. 
8 Neta and Pritchard, “McDowell and the New Evil Genius”. 
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belief that Φ which is both factive […] and reflectively accessible to S.9 
He thinks that such factive and reflectively accessible rational support can 
simply consist in “seeing that Φ.” This gives him grounds for denying (I), thereby 
avoiding the problem mentioned above. Pritchard has confined himself to defending 
specifically our perceptual knowledge against skepticism, although he does not rule 
out that the same lines of reasoning apply elsewhere, too. 
A clarification about the nature of our reflective access is in order. Although 
this statement of disjunctivism does not make it unambiguously clear here, Pritchard 
later says that he considers having reflective access to a factive reason to entail that 
we can know by reflection alone that this is a factive reason.10 This is important 
because it means that he is not merely claiming that our reflective access might just 
consist in being able to recognize that we have a reason for p without being able to 
see the factive nature of that reason. Such a kind of reflective access would indeed 
give us a powerful resource against skepticism, whereas the much weaker alternative 
would not serve as well. 
A natural question is what Pritchard means when he writes of “paradigmatic 
cases” of perceptual knowledge. He later introduces a taxonomy of “good” and “bad” 
cases of perception, and mentions that the disjunctivist has the best category, the 
“good+” cases, “in mind.” These are cases that are both (a) objectively and (b) 
subjectively good, meaning that the agent is in an environment in which her 
perception is functioning properly and is in possession of sufficient grounds for 
accepting the target proposition, including the absence of “defeaters” that prevent 
her from believing it. A “good+”case also requires (c) that the subject has veridical 
belief of the target proposition. Given this, the subject can be described as both 
“seeing that p” and “knowing that p.”11 
If one takes this as an explanation of what constitutes a “paradigmatic case” of 
perceptual knowledge, then it is irritating that “good+” cases are the only ones which 
allow knowledge. It is unclear then why the restriction to “good+” cases would be of 
any help to explaining what constitutes a “paradigmatic case” of perceptual 
knowledge, for any case of knowledge is a “good+” case.12 The issue of what counts 
as a paradigmatic case will be relevant later on. 
                                                        
9 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13. 
10 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 46. 
11 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 29-31. 
12 An important problem which I will not discuss here is that it is open to the skeptic to debate 
whether there are any “good+” cases. 
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I have already mentioned that epistemological disjunctivism promises a 
treatment of skepticism, at least of the kind of skepticism that arises from any version 
of the underdetermination problem. Pritchard mentions another motivation for his 
position: when we are challenged to provide reasons for our beliefs, or self-acclaimed 
knowledge, we often invoke factive locutions such as “I (can) see that....”13 As 
mentioned, for Pritchard the fact that I see that p simply is my reason for believing 
that p, which, as he points out, matches a common way of talking in ordinary 
discourse. He argues that this naturalness should give disjunctivism the status of a 
“default position.” 
III. Problems for Disjunctivism 
So far, I have mainly been outlining the positive claims of disjunctivism and how 
they are motivated. But there are serious problems for this position. In particular, 
Pritchard recognizes three “core problems” internal to the position, which I will 
discuss below. To begin with, it is also worth mentioning that Pritchard accepts a 
more general problem: while disjunctivism has a straightforward way of rejecting 
underdetermination-based skepticism, it is not so clear how disjunctivists should 
handle closure-based skepticism. He points out that they can just claim that we even 
have knowledge that we are not in an Evil Demon scenario for we can have 
reflectively accessible factive rational support for not being in such a scenario, e.g. 
by seeing that we have hands.14 This would avoid the problem at the heart of closure-
based skepticism, namely the intuition that we can know certain empirical 
propositions but not the denials of skeptical hypotheses, even if the latter 
immediately follow from the former. However, the claim that we do actually know 
that we are not in an Evil Demon scenario seems too strong to Pritchard. If that is 
right, disjunctivists face the challenge to provide an explanation of this intuition. 
Pritchard’s own approach is to instead accept this intuition and embrace a neo-
Wittgensteinian theory of hinge propositions and denying that these can be 
rationally evaluated in the same way as other propositions.15 The idea is that we can 
                                                        
13 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 17-8. This applies to perceptual knowledge as well as to other forms 
of knowledge, which we may provide reasons for by claiming that “I remember that...” or “I can 
show that....” “I see that...” also has a reading on which it does not state a perceptual position, but 
that I understand a certain argument or the like. 
14 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 157-63. 
15 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 173-9. Other than pointing out that we need something like this to 
address closure-based skepticism, Pritchard offers no reason to accept this combination of two 
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assume these hinge propositions in our evaluation of other propositions so that those 
will often count as known, but we need not say that we also know the hinge 
propositions. I will here only discuss disjunctivism not amended in this way, but the 
problems discussed below apply to the amended version just as well. 
The general problem of skepticism aside, Pritchard discusses these three “core 
problems” for disjunctivism:16  
1. The basis problem. Intuitively, we would say that seeing that p can serve as a 
basis for knowing that p. But on the disjunctivist conception, seeing that p is 
understood in a particularly strong way, requiring the truth of p and reflective 
access to the fact that one sees that p. The worry then is that seeing that p is in 
fact something so strong that it already presupposes knowing that p. This would 
prevent us from saying that it constitutes a basis for knowing that p. 
2. The access problem. A general problem for semantic externalists is that they 
have to carefully state the privileged access one has to one’s mental states in 
order not to commit themselves to claiming that one can come to know facts 
about one’s environment by mere reflection.17 A similar problem applies to 
disjunctivism: if we can reflectively access our reasons and some of these 
reasons imply the truth of the embedded proposition, then, in these cases, it 
seems that one can by reflection alone come to know that proposition. But then 
positing reflective access to empirical reasons leads to the claim that we can 
come to know empirical proposition based on reflection alone, which seems 
wrong. 
3. The distinguishability problem. The disjunctivist reply to underdetermination-
based skepticism is to say that the factive reasons we have in support of many 
everyday propositions are different from the reasons a corresponding subject in 
a skeptical scenario that is internally indistinguishable has. But then, because 
the non-deceived subject is supposed to have access to her reasons, she should 
be able to distinguish her reasons from a deceived subject’s reasons. But this 
would mean that she can distinguish her situation from a situation in a skeptical 
scenario. This would be denying the fundamental intuition underlying 
Cartesian skepticism that we can not distinguish between being the victim of 
an evil demon and being in a world that is roughly as we expect it, which just 
                                                        
views that are in a fundamental tension. Wittgensteinians believe that rational evaluation is 
essentially local because we need hinge propositions in the background to be able to conduct such 
evaluations. But disjunctivism posits reasons that are so strong that there is no longer any reason 
to claim that we would need such hinges in the background of our local evaluations. 
16 See Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 19-22; Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 127-32. 
17 Michael McKinsey, “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 51 (1991), 9–16. 
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seems undeniably true. 
Ultimately, I wish to argue that the disjunctivist cannot respond to both the 
basis problem (at least in a slightly revised version) and the access problem at the 
same time. I do not take any stance on whether each of the three problems may by 
itself be addressed by the disjunctivist in a satisfactory way. To make my point, let 
me run through these problems and discuss which options are open to the 
disjunctivist and which route Pritchard is recommending. 
First the basis problem. This problem is related to what Pritchard calls the 
entailment thesis, namely that seeing that p entails knowing that p.18 His own 
approach is to deny the entailment thesis and argue for the possibility of cases in 
which we see that p without knowing that p. Let me first briefly discuss whether 
the disjunctivist can retain the entailment thesis in the face of the basis problem.  
It might seem that a possible strategy was to claim that knowledge can be 
based on seeing because it entails knowing. Alan Millar defends a version of 
disjunctivism on which the relevant reasons are explanatory or motivating, i.e. they 
explain why the subject has that knowledge.19 The idea would be to say that our 
seeing that p provides an explanans of our knowing that p that is strong enough to 
entail the truth of the explanandum. This is correct in one sense: when we discuss 
the epistemic situation of a subject S, we may well use the fact that S sees that p to 
argue for and explain the fact that S knows that p. However, this explanation cannot 
be an explanation of the way S arrived at her knowledge that p. S must have gone 
through some process (however simple) of forming a belief that p when first seeing 
that p. But we cannot claim that such a psychological process is logically guaranteed 
to take place. Note that any non-disjunctivist position can allow a contingent process 
either by saying that one has only access to non-factive reasons or by saying that 
there are no factive reasons, and thus a further step of assessing or weighing the 
reasons we do have access to would be required to arrive at belief. 
Millar escapes this problem by understanding motivating reasons as reasons 
for which I believe something. On this conception, a reason can only become a 
motivating reason once I believe the relevant proposition, so there is no need for me 
to a process of belief-formation anymore. This does indeed avoid the problem, but, 
as Millar notes, it also gives up on any ambition to address underdetermination-
                                                        
18 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 25. 
19 Alan Millar, “Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (2014): 1-19, and “Perceptual Knowledge and 
Well-Founded Belief,” Episteme 31 (2016): 43-59. 
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based skepticism: Millar’s motivating reasons are not sources of justification, and 
invoking them as such would invoke our knowledge to justify the very same 
knowledge.20 This points out an important qualification of the basis problem: it is a 
problem for those who want our reasons to be a basis that justifies our beliefs. And 
only if one allows this justificatory role of reasons can one employ the disjunctivist’s 
trademark move of invoking one’s reasons as rational support that favors our beliefs 
over skeptical hypotheses. 
So insofar as disjunctivism aims at a response to skepticism, Pritchard is right 
to approach the basis problem by offering reasons to deny the entailment thesis and 
thus making conceptual space for states of seeing that p without knowing that p. His 
strategy is to claim that seeing that p merely “guarantees that one is in a good 
position to gain knowledge,” but that there are cases in which one is “unable to 
exploit this opportunity.”21 He motivates this claim with a version of Goldman’s ‘fake 
barn’ case:22 
Suppose […] that one is in a situation where one is genuinely visually presented 
with a barn and circumstances are in fact epistemically good (there’s no deception 
in play, one’s faculties are functioning properly, and so on). But now suppose 
further that one has been told, by an otherwise reliable informant, that one is 
presently being deceived (that one is in barn façade county, say), even though this 
is in fact not the case. Clearly, in such a case one ought not believe the target 
proposition, and hence one cannot know this proposition either. […] Does it follow 
that one does not see that the target proposition obtains? I suggest not.23 
As Pritchard explains, the situation here is one in which one is presented with 
a misleading defeater which prevents knowledge.24 He argues that one still counts as 
seeing that p because we would intuitively describe this case as an instance of seeing 
that p once we recognize that the defeater was indeed misleading. The general claim 
is that such defeaters prevent knowledge, but may not always prevent the possession 
of factive reasons. Note that Pritchard is not merely arguing that in the scenario 
described one counts as seeing a barn (a highly intuitive claim), but that one also 
                                                        
20 Millar, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 56. 
21 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 26. 
22 Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 
(1976): 771–791.  
23 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 26. 
24 See also Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 127-129. 
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counts as seeing that there is a barn. Once we enforce this distinction, it is less clear 
whether Pritchard’s claim is indeed intuitively plausible.25 
But let us accept the example here just for the sake of the argument. A 
noteworthy aspect of it then is this: while we are presented an alleged case of having 
a factive reason for p without knowing that p, Pritchard later clarifies that he does 
not consider this a case of a reflectively accessible reason, for the defeater obstructs 
our reflective access to our factive reason.26 That is to say, as long as one believes 
that one is or might well be deceived by a barn façade, one would not and could not 
be aware that one sees that there is a barn, but only that one appears to be seeing a 
barn. But note that he has initially stated that seeing that p simply is a type of 
reflectively accessible reason,27 and he has used it as his go-to example for such 
reasons. This would have seemed to commit him to not accepting the barn case as 
an instance of genuinely seeing that p. Note also that the presence of a defeater is 
something that, according to Pritchard’s taxonomy discussed above, rules out 
counting such a case as a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge (although, of 
course, there is no knowledge in this case anyway). 
But what if we accept that the subject in the barn case sees that there is a barn 
without having reflective access to that reason? Of course, the existence of cases of 
seeing that p without knowing that p would be a counterexample against the 
entailment thesis as formulated by Pritchard. This would solve the version of the 
basis problem arising from the entailment thesis. But one should then also worry 
about the relation between reflectively accessible factive reasons and knowledge. 
Consider this modification of the entailment thesis: 
The entailment* thesis:  
Having a reflectively accessible factive reason that p entails knowing that p. 
If the entailment* thesis is true, a version of the basis problem remains 
pressing: if one has a reflectively accessible factive reason, one should not be 
logically guaranteed to also have knowledge, for this leaves no room for a contingent 
                                                        
25 Craig French, “The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 86-104, takes this line of criticism. 
26 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 50. The same is true of Prichard’s other type of 
examples of seeing that p without knowing that p (ibid., 32). These are cases in which one believes 
that p on another basis than perception, e.g. wishful thinking. These cases, too, only seem to count 
as not involving knowledge as long as the subject does not have rational access to her factive reason 
for p. 
27 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 14. 
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process of forming a belief on the basis of one’s reasons. Intuitively, one would need 
to actually access one’s reason to arrive at knowledge – otherwise, we cannot say 
that our knowledge is based on and justified by our reason. But we cannot make this 
work if by having such a reason one is logically guaranteed to already have 
knowledge. If the entailment* thesis were true, there could not be any reflectively 
accessible factive reasons that are not already accessed. Let me call this the basis* 
problem. 
In fact, we do not even need a notion as strong as logical entailment to 
generate the basis* problem. Here is a general version: 
The necessity thesis:  
Necessarily: If S has a reflectively accessible factive reason that p, then S knows 
that p. 
This thesis leaves open the notion of necessity involved. Let me here work 
with epistemic or a priori necessity, i.e. the claim that we can infer a priori from S’s 
having a rationally accessible factive reason for p that S knows that p. This would 
then mean that in any a priori possible case in which S has a reflectively accessible 
factive reason that p, S knows that p. Thus the disjunctivist could still not make sense 
of a contingent process of forming a belief on the basis of a reason if one is necessarily 
to have knowledge. The strongest version of a necessity thesis that disjunctivists 
might be able to accept would be a version which claims that having a reflectively 
accessible reason is followed by knowledge with “psychological necessity.” This 
would still be contentious, but at least disjunctivists could posit some kind of laws of 
belief-formation which could cite the possession of reasons as a basis of knowledge. 
What the disjunctivist would need to refute her commitment to the 
entailment* thesis and the necessity thesis is a possible case in which a subject has a 
reflectively accessible factive reason for p, but lacks knowledge that p. Pritchard 
arguably does not offer such an example, for in his examples the subjects in question 
seem to lack reflective access to their reasons. In addition to this, his taxonomy of 
cases only allows one type of “paradigmatic” cases of perception in which one has 
reflectively accessible factive reasons – the “good+” cases –, and these cases are 
branded as cases of knowledge.28 But maybe such cases still are possible. My 
argument later will be that we do not need to decide on the question whether such 
cases are possible (in any relevant sense), because either answer leads to trouble for 
disjunctivism. 
                                                        
28 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 29. 
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To be able to do this, I need to discuss the access problem. From the discussion of 
the basis* problem above it is apparent that the two problems are related, for both 
arise from the danger of positing too close a link between our reasons and our actual 
beliefs. However, while the basis* problem problematizes the claim that our reasons 
guarantee knowledge, the access problem problematizes the idea that we can achieve 
knowledge from our reasons without external input. 
Pritchard offers the following setup of the access problem: 
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific 
empirical proposition p is the factive reason R. [Premise] 
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise]  
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. [From 
(AP1), (AP2)]29 
Pritchard points out that the argument actually not deductively valid, for S 
will not have come to be “in possession” of R by mere reflection, and thus it would 
not be by reflection alone that S knows that p.30 Indeed, in the case of vision I can 
only come to be seeing that p given the right empirical circumstances, and thus there 
is an empirical element in the course of my coming to believe and know that p. 
Therefore S’s belief that p is not a priori, as Pritchard insist, but it is rather belief 
based on an empirical reason.31 
He recognizes that this response assumes that the possession of a reflectively 
accessible reason led up to belief. But what about cases in which a subject is in 
possession of such a reason, but this reason does not lead to a belief? The subject 
might here believe that p for a different (non-empirical) reason, or she might not 
believe that p at all. Pritchard discusses this as a revised setup of the problem: 
(AP1’) S can know by reflection alone that she is in possession of the factive reason 
R for believing the specific empirical proposition p (although she does not 
believe p on that basis, or any other empirical basis). [Premise] 
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise] 
                                                        
29 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 46. 
30 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 47. Note also that given the entailment* thesis, in this 
setup S would already count as knowing that p given her true belief on the basis of a factive 
reflectively accessible reason. 
31 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 129. 
The Basis-Access Dilemma for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
163 
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. [From 
(AP1’), (AP2)]32 
The idea here is that S can come to know p by reflection alone, i.e. she could 
move from a state of disbelief or poorly justified belief to a state of knowledge just 
by reflecting on the kind of reasons she possesses. Here, Pritchard’s response is to 
deny that (AP1’) can be the case. While he admits that “seeing that p can come apart 
from believing that p,” he thinks that instances of this such as the barn case do not 
support (AP1’): 
In such a case there seems no reason at all for the epistemological disjunctivist to 
concede that the agent concerned has reflective access to the factive reason. Their 
claim, after all, is only that the rational basis for your beliefs – i.e. the reasons on 
which one’s beliefs are based – needs to be reflectively accessible. […] Moreover, 
although the epistemological disjunctivist is willing to part company with the 
philosophical herd and claim that one’s seeing that p can33 be reflectively accessible 
to one in cases where one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p (such that 
one believes that p on the basis of seeing that p), it does not follow from this trail-
blazing stance that they are thereby committed to supposing that in every case 
where one sees that p it is reflectively accessible to one that this is so.34 
In this passage, Pritchard explicitly denies that one needs to have reflective 
access to one’s seeing that p. As mentioned, this is curios, for he initially introduced 
seeing that p as an instance of a reflectively accessible factive reason.35 Be the notion 
of seeing that p as it may, it should be beginning to become apparent that I think his 
denial of the possibility of (AP1’) is in tension with a full treatment of the basis* 
problem, specifically the version of it arising from the necessity thesis. Let me 
therefore look at the question whether the disjunctivist could instead accept the 
possibility of (AP1’). 
The formulation above is still not quite a logically valid argument. But 
consider the following reformulation, the gist of which I borrow from Tim Kraft.36 
Let R be a factive reason for the specific empirical proposition p. Then the problem 
arises in this setup: 
                                                        
32 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 49, my enumeration. 
33 To be clear, Pritchard has introduced epistemological disjunctivism as the claim that one has 
reflectively accessible factive reasons in all paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge. 
34 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 50. 
35 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 14, see above. 
36 Tim Kraft, “Epistemological Disjunctivism’s Genuine Access Problem,” Theoria 81 (2015): 311–
332, here 316-317. 
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(AP1*) S can know by reflection alone that S is in possession of R. 
(AP2*) S can know by reflection alone that S being in possession of R entails p.  
(APC*) S can know by reflection alone that p. 
Kraft points out that the validity of this argument depends on the closure of 
reflective knowledge under reflectively known entailment.37 The relevant principle 
here would be: 
If S can know by reflection alone that Φ and S can know by reflection alone that Φ 
entails Ψ, then S can know by reflection alone that Ψ. 
This is, as Kraft notes, a highly plausible principle, and should be accepted 
especially by someone like Pritchard who is interested in retaining a version of the 
closure principle for knowledge. Given such a closure principle, the above argument 
is indeed logically valid. Accepting (AP1’) means that there is a true instance of 
(AP1*) in which S does not know that p.  
(AP2*) and (APC*) straightforwardly capture the intent of (AP2) and (APC), 
so given this version of closure of reflective knowledge the disjunctivist either has 
to deny (AP2) or accept (APC). (AP2) seems to follow from any reasonably strong 
statement of epistemological disjunctivism: if by reflective accessibility we mean 
that it is reflectively accessible that the reason in question is factive, then it is clear 
that reflecting on that reason will allow a subject to derive that her possessing that 
reason entails that the target proposition is true.  
This would leave the disjunctivist with the only remaining option of “biting 
the bullet” and accepting (APC). Maybe, one might argue, this is not such a 
meaningful concession, for the setup of the access problem required that S already 
has an empirical factive reason R, so S can know that p only given she has an 
empirical reason for this. In that sense, such knowledge would not be a priori but 
rather grounded in empirical reasons, for it is only possible given the right empirical 
                                                        
37 Three points are noteworthy: first, Neta and Pritchard, “McDowell and the New Evil Genius,” 
389, draw this inference under closure of just knowledge under known entailment, which is not 
quite the same. Second, the closure of possible reflective knowledge under reflectively known 
entailment, which is at work here (“S can know...”) and which I introduce above, follows from the 
closure of (actual) reflective knowledge under reflectively known entailment. Third, we do not 
have to demand possible reflective knowledge of the entailment in question to allow the validity 
of the argument, but a principle of the closure of possible reflective knowledge under just any 
knowable entailment (maybe due to testimony from a logician) is less plausible – we should not 
be willing to say that the thusly deduced proposition is still reflectively known. 
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circumstances and indeed some kind of perception or other empirical input. A 
problem, however, is that in such cases, as Pritchard notes, the route from the state 
of not knowing that p to knowing that p would be entirely reflective.38 This would 
again put us under pressure to allow for an empirical basis of our knowledge: instead 
of believing or knowing that p based on the empirical reasons we have, we would 
come to know that p based on reflection on the fact that we have p-entailing reasons 
(but no p-entailing beliefs). Sure enough, our reasoning would involve empirical 
reasons, but only to the extent that we recognize that we have them and that they 
are factive. They would not be our reasons for believing and knowing that p, but 
rather what gave rise to our actual reasons, which would be entirely introspective 
in nature.  
Perhaps the epistemological disjunctivist can actually bite that last bullet and 
claim that sometimes this simply is how we arrive at beliefs or knowledge. Maybe 
more troublesome is that such a kind of knowledge would lead to problems with the 
disjunctivist reply to underdetermination-based skepticism related to the 
distinguishability problem. Let me therefore briefly discuss this problem. 
Pritchard introduces a distinction between favoring and discriminating 
epistemic support. Favoring epistemic support is such that it favors a proposition p 
over its rivals in that it gives us better evidence for p, but does not entail its truth 
nor rule out all other hypotheses. Discriminating epistemic support, on the other 
hand, consists in the possession of discriminatory capacities that allow us to actually 
rule out certain scenarios or hypotheses.39 Of course, underdetermination-based 
skepticism seeks to exploit the fact that we typically lack discriminating epistemic 
support for our empirical beliefs. 
This distinction allows Pritchard to formulate a response to the 
distinguishability problem. Consider again the two subjects S1, who is in a scenario 
where most of her everyday beliefs are true, and S2, who is in an indistinguishable 
skeptical scenario. Clearly, both lack discriminating capacities to distinguish 
between their situations, for both scenarios by hypothesis present them with 
indistinguishable evidence. Still, both have favoring epistemic support for their 
beliefs: their perception, or other empirical sources, suggest that their beliefs are 
true; they can also rule out, among others, cases of “poor deception” in which their 
beliefs were false in an easily recognizable way. Pritchard argues that S1 is in a better 
epistemic position insofar as she is in possession of factive reflectively accessible 
                                                        
38 Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 130. 
39 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 77-81. 
Tammo Lossau  
166 
reasons for her paradigmatic perceptual beliefs. He claims that S1 actually can exploit 
this by recognizing the factivity of her reasons and deducing that her belief 
supported by this reason must be true. This is a capacity that S2 lacks: her reasons are 
neither factive nor are they reflectively accessible. The latter is important, for it 
explains why S2 can think that she has the exact reasons that S1 actually has. From a 
disjunctivist perspective she is ignorant about the non-factive nature of her reasons, 
and this explains her deception.40 
I will not discuss this response to the distinguishablity problem in greater 
depth, although that would be necessary to evaluate it. But note the fact that 
Pritchard thinks that if we have reflective access to our reasons, we can recognize 
the factive nature of our reasons and deduce from this that our beliefs are true. Of 
course, he commits himself only to the claim that we can have such reasons in 
instances where we already have knowledge, which is an important restriction for 
his response to the access problem. But this brings us back to the question whether 
it is open to the disjunctivist to accept (APC) and say that we can recognize our 
factive reasons and deduce the truth of the target proposition p in a case where we 
did not already know that p. 
I think that the disjunctivist cannot take that route because it would make her 
response to underdetermination-based skepticism question-begging. Suppose that S1 
takes a route to knowledge that p by recognition of her factive reason R1. Suppose 
again a subject S2 who is in an indistinguishable skeptical scenario. For the scenarios 
to be indistinguishable, S2 must mistakenly think (or be in a position to come to 
think) that she has R1, although she in fact only has the non-factive misleading 
reason R2. If S2 reflects on her R2, she will (by the reasoning discussed above) be lead 
to think mistakenly that R2 is factive and also infer that p is true. We can here see 
that the subjects cannot discriminate between R1 and R2.  
But this is where underdetermination-based skepticism comes in again. The 
skeptic may now argue that S1 cannot gain knowledge by reflecting on R1 because 
she cannot discriminate R1 from R2. After all, what better evidence does S1 have for 
thinking that she is in possession of R1 than S2? Here, the disjunctivist cannot appeal 
to the reflective accessibility of R1 without begging the question because the skeptic 
is disputing the claim that S1 can know that she has R1 given that she cannot 
discriminate between R1 and R2. That is to say, if the disjunctivist claims that R1 is 
somehow self-presenting as a factive reason, the skeptic will (justifiedly) object that 
this is exactly what the underdetermination problem questions, for how can R1 be 
                                                        
40 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 91-100.  
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self-presenting if it is indistinguishable from R2? S1 needs some other grounds for 
knowing that she has R1. 
The question then is: what could be the basis for S1 knowing that she has R1? 
Obviously, it is an introspective basis, but as we have just seen the kind of 
introspection relevant here is fallible. The disjunctivist now could try to apply her 
basic strategy again and claim that S1 has a factive and reflectively accessible 
introspective reason R3 for believing that she is in possession of R1, whereas S2 
merely has a misleading non-factive reason R4 for believing the same thing. R3, the 
disjunctivist could argue, is better rational support than R4 because it is factive and 
reflectively accessible. But, of course, R3 and R4 are also indistinguishable, giving rise 
to a new underdetermination-based skeptical problem: Can S1 know that she has R3? 
The skeptic here could force the disjunctivist into an infinite regress of reasons. 
Crucially, this type of regress would be vicious, for the disjunctivist would at no level 
be able to fully address underdetermination-based skepticism. Therefore, the 
disjunctivist would also beg the skeptic’s question by deferring to higher-order 
reasons. 
To avoid this problem, the disjunctivist needs to deny (APC), thereby not 
allowing the possibility of achieving knowledge by reflection on one’s factive 
reasons. Again, this is not a problem for Pritchard, for he only allows this type of 
recognition and deduction of the target proposition in cases where one already has 
knowledge of it. It is, however, a serious problem for disjunctivists wishing to “bite 
the bullet” on the access problem. 
IV. A Dilemma for Disjunctivism 
The above considerations put us in a position to formulate a dilemma for 
epistemological disjunctivism. The description of this dilemma will, at this point, 
largely be a summary of what has already been said, so I can be brief. Let us begin 
with the disjunctivist premise of the dilemma: 
Premise: 
In some cases of knowledge, we have reflectively accessible factive empirical 
reasons for our empirical beliefs in the sense that we can recognize by reflection 
that our reasons are factive. 
This is then followed by this question: 
Question: 
Is it (a priori) possible that a subject S possesses a reflectively accessible factive 
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empirical reason R for the empirical proposition p, but S does not know that p? 
First horn: No. The disjunctivist can claim that such a case is not possible, i.e. 
can be ruled out a priori. This, as we have seen, will then subject her to the basis* 
problem: how can our (empirical) knowledge be plausibly based on reflectively 
accessible reasons if such reasons guarantee knowledge? The basing relation should 
be understood as some kind of cognitive process – otherwise it disqualifies itself from 
serving as an explication of our justification. But such a process cannot be assumed 
to take place necessarily, i.e. we cannot plausibly know a priori that if S has a 
reflectively accessible factive reason R that S underwent a cognitive process 
following her possession of R, for such a process can only take place contingently. It 
thus seems that the possession of R presupposes that S knows that p, leaving no room 
for the kind of basing relation most disjunctivists are looking for. 
Second horn: Yes. The disjunctivist can answer affirmatively and thereby say 
that there is a possible case C in which S possesses a reflectively accessible empirical 
reason R for the empirical proposition p but does not know that p. But this will make 
C a problem case with respect to the access problem: S here has a path to knowing 
that p by just reflecting on R, for S can recognize that R is factive and then deduce 
that therefore p must be true. Although this is only possible given that S has the 
empirical reason R, this kind of route to knowledge is by itself problematic. Worse, 
however, is the fact that admitting this route to knowledge in C will deprive the 
disjunctivist of a satisfactory response to underdetermination-based skepticism. 
Because S’s knowledge in C would not be directly based on R, but on the recognition 
of R’s factivity, the skeptic can now object to S knowing that R is factive by pointing 
to the fact that S cannot distinguish R from a non-factive reason in a corresponding 
skeptical scenario. The disjunctivist here will either beg the question by pointing to 
R’s factivity (which the skeptic claims S is ignorant about), or she will need to open 
up an infinite regress of reflectively accessible factive reasons: a reason for the fact 
that she is in possession of R, a reason for the fact that she possesses that reason and 
so on. This regress, besides being highly implausible, will at no point satisfy the 
skeptic, either. 
It is not quite clear, which of the horns Pritchard is picking, but he seems to 
lean towards the first one. The fact that he describes the barn case as one in which 
one lacks reflective access to one’s seeing a barn clarifies that at least the example he 
provides is not one in which one has reflective access to a factive reason. Apparently, 
he understands the basis problem as a problem that only applies to seeing (that p) 
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and arises due to the entailment thesis; but he glosses over the version of the problem 
that arises out of the entailment* thesis or the necessity thesis. 
V. The Dilemma and Other Versions of Epistemological Disjunctivism 
So far, I have only discussed Pritchard’s particular version of epistemological 
disjunctivism. Let me end by briefly commenting on the question to what extent the 
dilemma formulated above applies to other versions of epistemological disjunctivism 
that have the same ambition to address skepticism (omitting views such as Millar’s 
which have no such ambition). I will comment on a version of disjunctivism that 
replaces “propositional” perception (“seeing that...”) with object perception, and on 
a contextualized version of disjunctivism. 
Let me begin with non-propositional epistemological disjunctivism. The idea 
is that instead of claiming that in paradigmatic cases of perception, we have a factive 
and reflectively accessible propositional attitude with respect to what we perceive, 
one merely claims that in such cases we have reflectively accessible factive 
perception of the objects we perceive. This view is most explicitly advocated by 
Craig French, but has also been alluded to by Charles Travis.41 
French developed this view in response to the basis problem. Remember that 
to rebut the entailment thesis Pritchard claimed that in the barn case one sees that 
there is a barn. French quite convincingly argues that this is intuitively not the case. 
However, it is very plausible that in this example one sees a barn.42 The idea here is 
that Pritchard cannot provide a plausible case of propositional seeing without 
knowing, but it is easy to provide a case of object perception without knowing that 
there is such an object – the barn case already counts as such an example. French 
therefore suggests that we instead claim that in paradigmatic cases of perception our 
rational support consists in seeing x or seeing an F thing. This is, of course, 
compatible with the disjunctivist thesis that we have reflective access to this support. 
These locutions are also factive, i.e. seeing an x or an F thing implies that there 
actually is an x or an F thing.43 
                                                        
41 French, “The Formulation;” Charles Travis, “The Silences of the Senses,” in his Perception: Essays 
After Frege (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23-58, here 29-33. 
42 French, “The Formulation,” 91-93. 
43 French, “The Formulation,” 96-102. French points out that this is actually just a specification of 
Pritchard’s formulation of the core thesis of disjunctivism (see above) which only states that the 
rational support in paradigmatic cases of perception is factive and reflectively accessible, but does 
not incorporate any commitment to propositionality (ibid., 95). 
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On this view it is clear that there are many cases like the barn case in which 
one sees an object without knowing that there is such an object. What is again 
unclear, though, is whether there are (possible) cases in which one has reflectively 
accessible factive perceptual reasons without knowledge. It may be easier for 
advocates of this strand of epistemological disjunctivism to claim that there are, but 
either way the dilemma arises as above. If there are no such cases possible, then it 
seems dubious how these reasons can serve as a basis for our beliefs and knowledge, 
which is supposedly to arise through a contingent process out of them, and yet also 
necessarily guarantee this knowledge. If there are such cases, then in these cases one 
has a purely reflective path to knowing that, say, there is a barn by recognizing the 
factive nature of one’s seeing a barn and simply deducing that there is a barn. Also, 
just like above, if one just accepts that this is possible, cases like these seem to beg 
the question against the skeptic: one cannot simply claim that seeing that there is a 
barn just is a self-presenting reason when the skeptic is arguing that we cannot 
discriminate between seeing a barn and seeing a barn façade. Alternatively, the 
recognition of the fact that one is seeing a barn could itself be construed as a factive 
reason, but this would lead to an implausible infinite regress that would not provide 
a response to the skeptic, either. 
Let me now turn to the idea of a contextualized version of epistemological 
disjunctivism. This view has been suggested, although not fully endorsed by Ram 
Neta.44 Neta champions a version of epistemological disjunctivism that is open to 
both propositional and non-propositional reasons.45 In his earlier work, Neta has 
argued that the extent to which we have evidence (and we might here read: reasons) 
may depend on context. In most “contexts of epistemic appraisal,” our evidence does 
                                                        
44 Ram Neta, “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 56 (2003): 1-31 and “A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism,” Noûs 45 
(2011): 658–695; see also Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 147-52. In “Contextualism and the Problem,” 
Neta develops the idea that our evidence depends on the context, but does not yet defend a 
disjunctivist account of it. In “A Refutation,” along with other papers, he endorses such an account 
but does no longer elaborate on the context-sensitivity of the accessibility of evidence or reasons. 
He does, however, make an exception for circumstances where a question asked “defeats [his] 
justification” (Neta, “A Refutation,” 665), and he later writes this (ibid., 669): 
According to the Cartesian Infallibilist view that I am describing, to have empirical 
knowledge, we must have reflective access to infallible empirical reasons. 
Fortunately, I claim, we often have this.  
45 Neta, “A Refutation,” 686. 
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support conclusions about the external world, but in skeptical contexts, it does not. 
He argues that S has evidence E for p only if E favors p over some alternatives 
relevant in the context of epistemic appraisal, which for him means that E allows S 
to discriminate between p and a relevant alternative. He further argues that when 
we raise a (skeptical) hypothesis H that is not ruled out by S’s evidence, we restrict 
S’s evidence to those mental states that S would also have in H. Connecting this with 
disjunctivism, this would mean that when the skeptic brings up, say, the Evil Demon 
scenario (which we cannot rule out in the sense that we cannot discriminate 
between it and the world as we ordinarily think it is), she restricts our evidence – or 
let us say reasons – and rules out any factive reasons we might have that we would 
not have in the Evil Demon scenario. Our reasons would then mainly consist of 
“seemings” and phenomenal appearances. Thus, in such a context, we have no 
definitive reasons to believe that we have hands, but in ordinary contexts, we have 
such reasons.46 The view here is that it depends on the context which reasons we 
have. A maybe even more plausible version of this position would be one according 
to which it depends on the context which reasons we have access to. 
This position is attractive because it can address both skeptical problems, 
whereas unqualified Pritchard-style disjunctivism fails to address the closure-based 
problem. But what about the dilemma I posed above? It seems that with respect to 
the first horn, the situation is roughly the same: if there are no (possible) cases in 
which one has reflectively accessible factive reasons without knowledge, then the 
basis* problem will be just as pressing. However, if one allows such cases – and Neta’s 
openness to object perception as a factive reflectively accessible reason suggests 
exactly that – the situation is somewhat different. There remains the worry that in 
such cases, there is a reflective path to knowledge, which one may find 
psychologically implausible. What does not arise, however, is the concern about 
begging the question against skepticism. One can argue that those reasons are just 
self-presenting in an ordinary context, but not so in a skeptical context. In such a 
skeptical context, we would not have access to, or not even have, factive reasons 
that, say, we have hands; but in an ordinary context, there are such reasons available. 
If the contextualist disjunctivist thus is willing to “bite the bullet” and accept that 
there is a purely reflective path to knowledge in cases of reflectively accessible 
factive reasons, then she will be able to hold this position in the face of the dilemma 
I have raised. 
                                                        
46 Neta, “Contextualism and the Problem,” 21-25. See also Jessica Brown, “Contextualism about 
Evidential Support,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2016), 329-354. 
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Conclusion 
I have posed a dilemma for epistemological disjunctivism purporting to show that 
while it may be able to address some of the three “core problems” Pritchard 
discusses, it cannot address all of them at the same time. While I have focused on 
Pritchard’s version of disjunctivism, the dilemma also applies to versions that replace 
propositional perception with object perception. The contextualized version of 
epistemological disjunctivism fares better: if one claims that there are cases of 
reflectively accessible factive reasons without knowledge, one is still committed to 
a perhaps implausible reflective path to knowledge in such cases, but at least one 
should then not be charged with begging the question against skepticism.47 
                                                        
47 I would like to thank Michael Williams for useful conversations about some ideas in this paper 
and three anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier versions of it. 
